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The One un-American Act: Can Donald Trump Block Me On Twitter? 
(Working Title) 
 
I. Something Wicked This Way Comes: The First Amendment and the Internet  
 
Somewhere in the White House, President Donald Trump is putting the finishing touches on 
his latest one-hundred and forty character masterpiece—a masterpiece that is sure to both 
provoke the ire of his critics and elicit the exultation of his supporters.  Trump’s use of Twitter, 
the popular social media platform, is unlike any we have seen from a United States President. In 
his own words, Trump characterized his use of social media not as Presidential, but as “modern 
day Presidential.”1 Past American Presidents have no doubt been the center of scandals and 
public criticism, but none have been so entrenched in controversy because of a mere tweet2 like 
Donald Trump. Although Trump may have known his twitter use would provoke contentious 
debate, it’s hard to say if he ever thought his use of social media would land him in court—but 
it’s done just that.  
In July 2017, the Knight First Amendment Institute, an organization dedicated to defending 
and strengthening the freedoms of speech and press in the digital age, filed a complaint in the 
Southern District of New York against Trump, alleging that his twitter account, 
@realdonaldtrump, constitutes a designated public forum.3 As such, when Trump blocking other 
users from accessing his account—the Knight First Amendment Institute argues, their first 
amendment rights are infringed. Since the Internet and social media sites in general are relatively 
                                                 
1 Donald Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (July 1, 2017, 3:41 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/881281755017355264?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2
Fwww.latimes.com%2Fpolitics%2Fla-pol-updates-everything-president-fake-1498958671-htmlstory.html  
2 A Tweet is the name for a posting made on the social media website Twitter. 
3 Compl. ¶ 47, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3892179/2017-07-11-Knight-Institute-Trump-
Twitter.pdf  
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new phenomena, there is little, if any, case law to guide the courts in determining how first 
amendment rights and cyberspace intersect. Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court recently 
addressed, for the first time, the relationship between the First Amendment “and the modern 
internet” in Packingham v. North Carolina. 4  
In Packingham, the Supreme struck down a state statute that made it “a felony for a 
registered sex offender to access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex 
offender knows that the site permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain 
personal Web pages.”5 Recognizing that this case was “one of the first” the Supreme Court had 
taken “to address the relationship between the first amendment and the modern internet,” Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the Court, carefully avoided any insinuation that the First Amendment 
provided “scant protection for access to vast networks [of the modern internet].”6 One of the 
most important places for the exchange of views in today’s modern world, Justice Kennedy 
asserted, is cyberspace, “the vast democratic forums of the Internet in general, and social media 
in particular.” 7  Today, “seven in ten American adults use at least one Internet social networking 
service,” and many use social media as a source “for knowing current events, checking ads for 
employment . . . and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge.”8 
Social media spaces not only “provide the most powerful mechanisms available to a private 
citizen to make his or her voice heard,” but they also “allow a person with an Internet connection 
to become a town crier with a voice that resonates further than it could from any soapbox.”9 
                                                 
4 137 S.Ct 1730, 1736 (2017) 
5 Id. at 1733 
6 Id. at 1736 
7 Id. at 1735 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 1737. 
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Indeed, social media sites could be thought of, as Justice Kennedy put it, as “the modern public 
square.”10  
Recognizing social media’s influence, many government agencies have started using social 
media platforms to solicit and respond to public comments.11 The use of social media by 
government agencies and officials like Donald Trump poses novel legal questions about whether 
social media spaces can constitute public forums for speech and, for that matter, whether the 
public forum doctrine itself has any applicability over cyberspace. 
The public forum doctrine developed with real property in mind, not property over 
cyberspace or webpages. In the typical case, the government opens or uses real property for 
expressive activity and, if there is an alleged First Amendment violation, the court goes through 
a forum analysis to determine the property’s nature and the extent of the government’s ability to 
enforce content based restrictions on speech.12 However, it is not abundantly clear that the 
principles applying to real property are equally applicable to property over cyberspace—or 
whether cyberspace constitutes property at all.13 Additionally, the public forum doctrine is 
applicable to government owned property, while social media webpages and accounts are private 
property belonging to companies like Twitter and Facebook.14 The Supreme Court has never 
decided whether private property, used by the government, could constitute a public forum.  
This article explores the government’s ability to designate its social media accounts as public 
forums. Part II outlines the public forum doctrine and discusses the different approaches taken by 
                                                 
10 Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 
11 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., SOCIAL MEDIA: FEDERAL AGENCIES NEED POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR 
MANAGING AND PROTECTING INFORMATION THEY ACCESS AND DISSEMINATE 13 (2011) 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/320244.pdf 3 
12 See generally Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985) 
13 David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity and Executive Power, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 785, 837-44 (2012) (discussing 
ambiguity over property status of cyberspace).  
14 E.g. Cornelius, 473 U.S. 802 at 799-801. 
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the Circuit Courts as a result of confusing Supreme Court precedent. Part III discusses the 
property status of webpages. Internet companies like Twitter and Facebook own a possessory 
interest in their webpages, which not only establishes their status as private property, but also 
helps facilitate the forum analysis in the context of social media. Even though social media 
spaces are private property, the forum analysis can still be applied. Part IV explores how the 
Circuit Courts have applied the forum analysis and investigates under what circumstances the 
Circuit Courts have found a designated public forum. Part V discusses the importance of the 
Circuit Courts in resolving first amendment disputes over social media. Part VI explores how the 
forum analysis could be applied to a variation of the situation presented in Packingham. Part VII 
explores whether Donald Trump can constitutionally block users on twitter.  
II. An Elegant Doctrine For A More Simplistic Time: Defining the Public Forum 
Doctrine 
Not all property is equal under the First Amendment. The public’s right of access to 
particular government property, and its ability to exercise its first amendment rights on that 
property, depends entirely upon the character of the property itself.15 In characterizing property, 
courts have routinely relied on the public forum doctrine. In essence, the public forum doctrine 
seeks to determine what publicly owned property must be made available for speech and under 
what circumstances. Generally speaking, publicly owned property falls into one of three 
categories: traditional public forum, designated public forum, or nonpublic forum.16 While each 
forum is treated differently, public forums share some common rules. 17 
                                                 
15 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) (“The existence of a right of access to 
public property and the standard by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the 
character of the property at issue”).  
16 E.g. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 
17 The term “public forums” references both the traditional and designated public forum.  
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In order to minimize disruptions in public forums, the government may impose reasonable 
time, place and manner restrictions if they are “justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech,” serve a  “significant government interest,”  and “leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.”18 Under the First Amendment, the government 
has no power “to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its 
content.”19 The validity of the government’s content or subject matter restrictions are entirely 
dependent on the categorization of the property, because different levels of scrutiny apply to the 
different categories of forum. 
On one end of the spectrum is the traditional public forum. Traditional public forums are 
places that “have been held in trust for the use of the public, and . . . have been used for purposes 
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens and discussing public questions.”20 
Sidewalks, streets and parks have routinely been found to constitute traditional public forums.21 
In a traditional public forum, content based restrictions are reviewed under strict scrutiny: the 
regulation must be “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end.”22  
At the other end of the spectrum is the nonpublic forum. Nonpublic forums are “public 
property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication.”23 The State 
is subjected to a more relaxed standard of scrutiny, rational basis review, when it tries to enforce 
content based restrictions in a nonpublic forum. In a nonpublic forum, the State may enforce 
content based exclusions and “reserve the forum for its intended purpose” so long as the 
                                                 
18 Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452, U.S. 640, 648 (1981).  
19 Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). 
20 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46  
21 Id.   
22 Id.   
23 Id.   
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“regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because 
public officials oppose the speaker’s views.”24 The idea behind the nonpublic forum is that the 
First Amendment “does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or 
controlled by the government.”25 If the principal function of the property “would be disrupted by 
expressive activity, the Court . . . is reluctant to hold that the government intended to designate a 
public forum.”26 Places such as jailhouses and military reservations have been found to be 
nonpublic forums.27  
Lying between the traditional and nonpublic forum categories is the designated public forum. 
This forum consists of government property that the state opens to the general public for 
expressive activities.28 In a designated public forum, the government is subject to the same level 
of scrutiny as a traditional public forum: the government must show a compelling state interest to 
enforce content based exclusions.29 While no court disputes its existence, this middle category of 
forum has been the subject of much confusion in the Circuit Courts.30 The confusion is the result 
of the inconsistency by the Supreme Court in using the terms ‘designated’ and ‘limited’ when 
referencing both the middle category and the nonpublic forum, casting ambiguity over the 
applicable level of scrutiny.31  
 
                                                 
24 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46 
25 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985) 
26 Id. 
27 Id.   
28 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46 
29 Id.   
30 Ascertaining the precise reason for the confusion and resolving it is beyond the scope of this article. For an in-
depth discussion of the problem, see Mark Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the Limited Public Forum, 33 NOVA L. 
REV. 299 (2009). 
31 E.g., Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 1999); Summum v. 
Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 913 (10th Cir. 1997); Cook v. Baca, 95 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1220 n. 7 (D.N.M. 2000); 
Scroggins v. City of Topeka, 2 F.Supp.2d 1362, 1370 n. 5 (D.Kan. 1998). 
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A. Pursuing the Unknown End: Supreme Court Precedent Creates Uncertainty  
When describing public forum categories in Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass’n32, 
the Supreme Court did not give the middle category a specific name. Rather, the Court merely 
stated that this category is created when the government “opened [property] for use by the 
public” and that it could be “either for a limited purpose, such as use by particular groups, or for 
the discussion of particular subjects.”33 In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund,34 the 
Court again failed to label the intermediate category, but underscored that it encompassed 
property “for use by the public at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers or 
for the discussion of certain subjects.”35 However, if the government were to “intentionally 
designate[] a place . . . as a public forum,” strict scrutiny would apply to content based 
restrictions and no speaker could be excluded without a compelling government interest.”36 
Finally, in International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness Inc. v. Lee37, the Court termed the 
middle category as a “designated public forum” and recognized that it could be “of a limited or 
unlimited character.” After defining both a traditional and designated public forum, the Court 
indicated that “all remaining public property” constituted nonpublic forums and would be 
subjected to “a much more limited review.”38  
These cases make clear that the middle category of public forum, the designated public 
forum, can be unlimited or limited in character and is subject to strict scrutiny. But Supreme 
Court decisions following Lee began to make things a little less clear, and a little more 
complicated. 
                                                 
32 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
33 Id. at 46 n.7.   
34 473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
35 Id. at 802. 
36 Id.  
37 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).  
38 Id.   
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The trouble started with Rosenberg v. Rector and Visitors of U. of Virginia.39 There, the 
Court declared that when the state reserves its property “for certain groups or for the discussion 
of certain topics,” a “limited public forum” is created.40 Justice Kennedy was right—his 
characterization of a public forum as one that could be “limited” is consistent with Supreme 
Court cases describing the designated public forum from Perry through Lee. But then Justice 
Kennedy did something that was inconsistent with those same cases: Kennedy stated that rational 
basis review, normally reserved for the nonpublic forum, rather than strict scrutiny, applies to 
content based restrictions in the limited public forum.41  
Justice Kennedy once again faced a question over  the forum status of property in Arkansas 
Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes.42 Kennedy, referring to the middle category as a 
“designated public forum,” stated that “if the government excludes a speaker who falls within the 
class to which a designated public forum is made generally available, its action is subject to strict 
scrutiny.”43 In distinguishing the designated public forum from the nonpublic forum, Kennedy 
departed from the construction used in Perry through Lee, and held that the defining quality was 
the level of access. If general access were granted, it would manifest an intent to create a 
designated public forum.44 But, if the government did “no more than reserve eligibility for access 
to the forum to a particular class of speakers,” then a designated forum was not created.45 In 
other words, if the government opened its property for a limited class of speakers or subjects, 
then the property is considered a nonpublic forum, in which content based restrictions are subject 
                                                 
39 515 U.S. 819 (1995).  
40 Id. at 829.  
41 Rosenberg, 515 U.S. at 829. 
42 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
43 Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677.  
44 Id. at 679. 
45 Id.  
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to rational basis review. Curiously, Kennedy announced, for the first time, that property may not 
constitute any kind of forum at all.46 
To recap, cases after Rosenberg arguably conflicted with earlier decisions of the Court.47 The 
earlier decisions, Perry through Lee, established that all government property is either a 
traditional, designated or nonpublic forum, and that a designated public forum could be either 
generally accessible or limited for certain speakers or subjects. Regardless of whether a 
designated public forum is unlimited or limited, content-based regulations are subject to strict 
scrutiny. Those cases coming after Rosenberg indicated, for the first time, that government 
property could not be public fora at all.48 Those cases defined the designated public forum as one 
that granted general access to the public. If there were any restrictions, either on the class of 
speakers or the topics to be discussed, then a nonpublic forum existed, and those restrictions 
would be reviewed under rational basis review. The ambiguity and conflict that these cases 
created was not lost on the Circuit Courts when attempting to determine the forum status of 
property. Many of the Circuit Courts have interpreted Supreme Court precedent differently, and 
have thus taken different approaches to the forum analysis. 
B. A Fig For The Other Side Of Complexity: The Circuit Courts’ Approach to the 
Designated Public Forum 
The First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have interpreted 
Supreme Court precedent to say that the limited public forum and designated public forum are 
interchangeable terms, or that the limited public forum is a subset of the designated public 
                                                 
46 Arkansas Educ. Television Com’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) 
47 E.g., Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 1999); Summum v. 
Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 913 (10th Cir. 1997). 
48 It appears that no Court has ever found that government property does not constitute some type of public forum. 
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forum.49 These courts recognize that the government may designate a space for use by the public 
generally for expressive activities, or for a limited class of speakers or for the discussion of 
limited subjects.50 Regardless of whether the forum is deemed a designated public forum or a 
limited public forum, or whether it is a subset of the designated public forum or its own category, 
those circuits have applied strict scrutiny to content based restrictions.51  
Other Circuits, such as the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have found that a limited 
public forum is a subset of the designated public forum, while the Ninth Circuit52 has found that 
a limited public forum is a subset of the nonpublic forum.53 In these Circuits, when the 
government designates property for public discourse and the property is open to the public 
generally, a designated public forum is created, and content based restrictions are subjected to 
strict scrutiny. A  limited public forum exists when the government designates property for 
public discourse but makes it available only to a limited class of speakers or for limited subjects. 
Unlike the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, when a limited public 
forum is found, the Second, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits courts have applied rational basis 
                                                 
49 see New Eng. Reg'l Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir. 2002) (stating that a designated 
public forum is sometimes called a limited public forum); Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland, 
193 F.3d 177, n.2 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting the confusion between the designated public forum and the limited public 
forum and applying the same strict scrutiny review to both); Goulart v. Meadows, 353 F.3d 239, 249-50 (4th Cir. 
2003); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that the intermediate category has been 
alternatively referred to both the "designated public forum" and the "limited public forum,” and that strict scrutiny 
applies to both); Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 675 n.11 (8th Cir. 1997) ( “designated” and “limited” used 
interchangeably, and settling on the term "limited public forum"); Barrett v. Walker Cty. Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 1209, 
1224 (11th Cir. 2017); Initiative & Referendum Inst. V. United States Postal Serv., 685 F.3d 1066, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) 
50 See cases cited supra note 50. 
51 See cases cited supra note 50.  
52 The Ninth Circuit is included in this group because, even though they place the limited public forum as a subset of 
the nonpublic forum as opposed to a designated public forum, like the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, rational 
basis review is applied to the limited public forum. 
53 Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 168 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001); Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 346-347 
(5th Cir. 2001); DeBoer v. Vill. of Oak Park, 267 F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir. 2001); DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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review. The difference between those two groups of circuits is the placement, and level of 
scrutiny applied to, the limited public forum.  
While the circuit courts may use differing terms and standards of scrutiny for the designated, 
or limited, public forum, the circuit courts all use the same general criteria for determining which 
category property will fall into: the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive 
activities, and the government’s intent, actual practice, and policy with respect to the property.54  
Considering that the public forum doctrine was created for analyzing what real property is 
available for speech, it is not immediately clear that the forum analysis would be applicable to 
intangible property like social media sites—but it almost certainly is.  
III. Reason Makes More Converts Than Time: The Emerging Property Status of 
Social Media Webpages 
With the rise of the Cyber Age, courts have begun to apply doctrines once made for tangible 
property to intangible property. For instance, despite the fact that the tort of conversion normally 
requires tangible property, some courts have recognized that conversion is equally applicable to 
intangible property.55 More importantly though, there have been several occasions where the 
Supreme Court has applied the public forum doctrine to nonphysical property.56 Companies like 
Twitter and Facebook own a possessory interest in their domain name, which should make 
applying the forum analysis to social media accounts easy.  
                                                 
54 See e.g. Summun v. Callaghan 103 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1997); United Food Com. Workers Union Local 1099 v. 
Sw. Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 355 (6th Cir. 1998).  
55 see e.g., Salonclick LLC v. Superego Mgmt. LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6871, 2017 WL 239379; Sprinkler 
Warehouse, Inc. v. Systematic Rain, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 16, 23 (Minn. 2016) (Internet domain name constitutes 
intangible personal property); Integrated Direct Mktg., LLC v. May, 495 S.W.3d 73, 76 (Ark. 2016) (intangible 
property, such as electronic data, can be converted). 
56 Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983) (forum analysis of school mail 
system); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund,, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985) (forum analysis of 
charitable contribution program); Rosenberg v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995) 
(forum analysis of Student Activity Fund), 
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Comprised of numerous interconnected communications and networks, the Internet connects 
“a wide range of end users to each other.”57 The domain name is “an alphanumeric text 
representation (often a word)” that identifies an Internet Protocol address (“IP address”) and 
serves as “the routing address for email, pictures, requests to view a web page, and other data 
sent across the Internet from other end users.”58 Just as a street address helps you find a specific 
house or property,  domain names make it easier to find the webpage and content you are 
searching for. If you were looking to access the homepage of Twitter, all you would need to do is 
type the domain name, www.twitter.com, into an internet search engine like Google, and you 
would find yourself brought directly to Twitter’s homepage. 
The Ninth Circuit found a property right in domain names by using a three-part test: (1) 
presence of an interest of precise definition; (2) capable of exclusive possession or control; and 
(3) putative owner establishes a claim to exclusivity.59 In describing the precise interest, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that “domain names are valued, bought and sold, often for millions of 
dollars” and are even “subject to in rem jurisdiction.”60 In terms of exclusive control, the court 
stated that the person who registers a domain name is the only person who “decides where on the 
Internet those who invoke that particular [domain] name—whether by typing into their browsers, 
by following a hyperlink, or by other means—are sent.”61 Finally, the Ninth Circuit compared 
owning a domain name to owning a plot of land, in that “it informs others that the domain name 
is the registrants and no one else’s.”62 
                                                 
57 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc. 356 F.3d 393, 409 (2d Cir. 2004). 
58 Id. at 409-10.  
59 Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003).  
60 Id.; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii). 
61 Id. 
62 Id.  
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Establishing that domain names qualify as a property right is useful for the forum analysis 
when applied to social media websites because it establishes ownership of the underlying 
property and the individual user accounts. When Twitter registered the domain name 
www.twitter.com, it essentially reserved a piece of internet real estate to be used for their 
service. In order to use that service, a person must register and reserve his or her own space or 
account within Twitter’s reserved internet space. By allowing other users to create accounts and 
use their service, social media companies like Twitter are effectively subleasing their private 
space for use by private or public individuals and entities. A domain name can convey all of this 
information and identify ownership. Twitter allowed President Trump to register the account 
“@realdonaldtrump”. When you want to access President Trump’s Twitter account, all you have 
to search for is www.twitter.com/@realdonaldtrump. The “/@realdonaldtrump” indicates that a 
user, in this case President Trump, has subleased a piece of Twitter’s internet real estate for his 
own use under that name. Similarly, if you wanted to access Rihanna’s twitter account, all you 
would have to search for is www.twitter.com/@rihanna. Another way to think about social 
media accounts is in the context of an easement. Basically, by registering an account, a user has 
reserved a ‘right of way’ to use that specific account name, and Twitter’s services generally. 
Thus, the domain name structure makes it easy to identify ownership of particular accounts.  
The domain name structure and its usefulness in identifying ownership of particular social 
media accounts on Twitter is equally applicable to other social media sites like Facebook. The 
URL structure for Facebook slightly differs from that of Twitter. Twitter allows users to make 
account names, and those names could either be a person’s real name (@BarackObama), a 
company name (@Starbucks), or some sort of alias (@TheNortoriousMMA).63 Facebook is a 
                                                 
63 @TheNotoriousMMA is the twitter account of UFC champion Conor McGregor. 
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little different because most account names are the names of the actual people using them. 
However, people with identical names register for Facebook accounts all the time without any 
problem. This is possible because of the way that Facebook structured its domain names. 
Www.facebook.com/johnmayer is the Facebook account of John Mayer, the 7 time Grammy 
Award winner, whereas www.facebook.com/JohnMayerRadio is the account of someone else 
with the same name. While the domain name itself can be useful in identifying account 
ownership by simply looking at the URL, as in the case of www.twitter.com/@realdonaldtrump, 
it may take a little investigation into the actual webpage when the account name is an alias, as in 
the case of Conor McGregor’s account www.twitter.com/@TheNotoriousMMA. 
A property right in a domain name should be enough to facilitate the forum analysis on social 
media pages. The URL structure, and the domain name in particular, help identify who owns the 
piece of internet real estate at issue, and also who may be subleasing part of that property for 
their own use.64 Even though domain names can be readily identified as property, it is still not 
necessarily clear that the forum analysis would apply to social media websites, because those 
sites are privately owned. Given that the Public Forum doctrine seeks to categorize government 
owned property, or public property, it is not immediately clear whether the government has the 
ability to designate privately owned property as a designated public forum. However, given 
doctrines like the state action limitation65 and principles governing the traditional public forum, 
there is no reason why the government should not be able to designate private property it uses for 
expressive activities as a public forum.  
A. Wisdom From The Past: Private Public Forums On Private Property 
                                                 
64 This is not meant to be a guide for ownership in other areas of law. See PhoneDog v. Kravitz, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 129229, 2011 WL 5415612 
65 See source cited infra note 87 
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 In most circumstances, First Amendment protections are not applicable when a person is on 
private property and is excluded.66 And yet, the courts have recognized that the nature of the 
underlying property is not always outcome determinative. Such was the case in Marsh v. State of 
Alabama.67 In that case, the Court considered whether a Jehovah’s witness could be criminally 
punished for distributing religious literature, contrary to the wishes of the town’s management, 
on the sidewalk of a privately-owned company town. The Supreme Court held that running a 
town is a public function, and therefore, the management of that town must be in compliance 
with the Constitution.68 When an owner, “for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the 
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and 
constitutional rights of those who use it.”69  
The court reached a similar conclusion in Evans v. Newton70, where a municipality tried to 
circumvent its constitutional obligation to operate a public park on a non-segregated basis by 
resigning as trustee and transferring title of the property to a private entity.71 The Court held that, 
even though title to the park rested in private hands, the “public character of the park requires 
that it be treated as a public institution.”72 Since “there had been no change in municipal 
maintenance and concern” over the facility, the Court announced that the park must be “treated 
as a public institution . . . regardless of who now has title under state law.”73 
                                                 
66 Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 96 S. Ct. 1029 (1976) (no first amendment right to picket in privately owned shopping mall); 
Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 92 S. Ct. 2219 (1972) (no first amendment right to leaflet in privately owned shopping 
mall). 
67 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
68 Marsh, 326 U.S.  at 504-08. 
69 Id. at 506.   
70 328 U.S. 296 (1966). 
71 Id. at 297-98.  
72 Id. at 302 
73 Id. at 300-302 
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In Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad74, the directors of the Chattanooga Memorial 
Auditorium denied an application by Southeastern Promotions to put on the play ‘Hair’ at the 
Tivoli theater—a  privately owned theater under long term lease to the municipality.75 In 
determining whether the denial of the application constituted a prior restraint, the Court 
described the Tivoli theater as a municipal facility “designed and dedicated for expressive 
activities.”76 The fact that the Tivoli was privately owned had no bearing on the constitutional 
question.   
In Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.,77 the Court confronted a first amendment 
challenge to Amtrak’s refusal to allow a man named Michael Lebron to use an advertisement 
space in Penn Station’s waiting room. In resolving the case, the Court determined that Amtrak, a 
private corporation, could be regarded as a government entity for First Amendment purposes.78 
Because the Constitution regarded Amtrak as governmental, congressional intent to label it a 
nongovernment entity does not “relieve it of its First Amendment restrictions” any more than “a 
similar pronouncement could exempt the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the Fourth 
Amendment.”79 Simply put, declaring an entity to be private “does not alter its characteristics as 
to make it something other than what it actually is.”80 The Circuit courts have generally followed 
the lead of the Supreme Court when it comes to resolving constitutional issues that require 
characterizing the nature of the underlying property.  
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In First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salk Lake City Corp.,81 the Tenth Circuit 
determined that a public easement over otherwise private property was subject to first 
amendment scrutiny. In that case, the court reasoned that the “forum analysis does not require 
the government to have a possessory interest in or title to the underlying land,” and that 
“government ownership or regulation is sufficient for the first amendment to exist.”82 
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar decision in Venetian Casino v. Local Joint Executive 
Bd..83 In that case, the Court had to determine whether the sale of a public sidewalk to a private 
business altered the nature of the property enough that it no longer constituted a public forum.84 
In holding that the property still constituted a public forum, the Court emphasized that “property 
that is dedicated to a public use is no longer truly private.”85 Even if a private owner retains title 
to the underlying property, “by dedicating the property to public use, the owner has given over to 
the State or to the public generally one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property, the right to exclude others.”86 In that circumstance, private 
owners “can no longer claim the authority to bar people from using the property because he or 
she disagrees with the content of their speech.”87 
When a private property owner opens up his property for use by the public, it is not 
automatically converted into a public forum that is subjected to first amendment protections. If 
that were the case, then almost any business that generally invites the public onto its premises to 
conduct business would be converted into a public forum. By virtue of allowing users to register 
accounts and use their service, Twitter itself does not become a public forum, and not every 
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account on Twitter will be subjected to first amendment scrutiny. Private individuals using a 
private account continue to possess the right exclude those people whose message or viewpoint 
they do not agree with from accessing their page or commenting on it. The public forum doctrine 
does not seek to automatically convert private property used by a private individual for 
expressive activities into a public forum, and strip away one of their most precious sticks in the 
bundle of property rights: the right to exclude others. Rather, state action must be found—the  
actions of the private individual or entity must be attributable to the state in order for 
constitutional protections to apply.88 A state action requirement “preserves an area of individual 
freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power.”89 Private individuals 
and entities that create social media accounts may exclude others for any reason, but when the 
government creates a social media account, their ability to exclude others is subjected to a forum 
analysis, even though the underlying property is privately owned by the social media company.   
Without a state action limitation, the government could simply abrogate its constitutional 
requirements by utilizing private entities or properties. This danger is most readily seen in Evans 
v. Newton.90 The fact that a private entity, as opposed to a governmental one, is trampling on our 
most basic rights does not make the constitutional violation any less egregious. Private 
infringement of basic freedoms are just as harmful as governmental violations. The difficulty in 
cases like Marsh, Evans, and Lebron is determining the point where we can no longer make a 
meaningful distinction between a private entity and the government for the purposes of 
constitutional protections. But once you have determined that the government is acting, there 
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seems to be no reason why the government cannot designate private property it uses as a public 
forum.  
If the government is using private property for expressive activities for the benefit of the 
public, the fact that the character of the underlying property is private should not matter—the  
property should effectively be seen as governmental.91 Cases like Marsh, Evans, Lebron, 
Marshfield, and Venetian Casino recognize that there are certain circumstances where 
constitutional protections are so strong that they may not be violated by either the government or 
by a private entity. Although these cases dealt with traditional public forums, like parks and 
sidewalks, their logic extends to the designated public forum. First, by virtue of reviewing 
content based restrictions in both a traditional public forum and the designated public forum 
under strict scrutiny, the public forum doctrine inherently recognizes that the public may have 
such a significant interest in accessing certain areas for speech that, whether the property has 
been historically used as places for speech or if the government has only recently used it for such 
a purpose, the government must show a compelling state interest to enforce content based 
restrictions.  Second, if the law does not allow the government to circumvent its constitutional 
responsibilities by using a private entity or by transferring their property to private individuals, 
why would the government be able to do so by merely renting or occupying private property? 
Marsh, Evans, Marshfield, and Venetian Casino focused on the continued dedication to public 
use. The public’s use of that property and their interest in the protection of their constitutional 
rights remained the same, regardless of whose hands the property was in. The same could be said 
when the government uses private property for expressive activities. Whether the government 
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intentionally opens up government owned or private property for expressive activities, the 
public’s interest in accessing that space remains the same.  
It is difficult to draw a distinction between property that is public and property that is private 
when the government is permitting the public to engage in expressive activities. If the public 
were permitted to freely use a municipally owned auditorium for expressive activities, there 
would be little doubt that the Constitution would restrict the government’s ability to enforce 
content based restrictions. But whether the underlying nature of that auditorium is public or 
private, the public’s interest in accessing that space to exercise free speech is the same.92 
Likewise, if the government were unable to accommodate a meeting between the general public 
and particular government officials because of spatial issues, and if the government were to then 
rent out a privately owned space for that meeting, there seems to be no reason why the 
government should then be able to exclude people at will. The nature of the meeting and the 
importance to the public remains the same whether that meeting takes place in a government 
owned building or one owned by a private individual.  
IV. A Fig For the Other Side of Complexity: The Circuit Court Approach to the 
Forum Analysis 
Having established the contours of the public forum doctrine and its applicability to both 
private property and social media sites, actually applying the forum analysis to social media 
websites becomes quite routine. Although the Supreme Court has never articulated clear criteria 
for categorizing property as a public forum, the courts look to general factors such as the nature 
of the property, its compatibility with expressive activities, the government’s intent, actual 
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practice and policy with respect to the property.93 Likewise, the circuit courts consider “the 
presence of any special characteristics regarding the environment” or property at issue.94 None of 
these factors are dispositive in the forum analysis.95 It should also be noted that these factors are 
most often used to determine whether a designated or nonpublic forum has been created because  
traditional public forums are places which have “immemorially been held in the trust for the use 
of the pubic, and time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”96 Very few places, if any, will ever 
meet that criteria other than sidewalks, streets and parks.97  
The government creates a designated public forum only when it intentionally makes property  
“not traditionally opened to assembly and debate” available for expressive use by the public or 
for specific speakers.98 A designated forum is not created through “inaction or by permitting only 
limited discourse . . . the government must intend to grant general access to its property for 
expressive use.”99 Courts may look to the “policy the government has adopted to govern access 
to the forum.”100 If a person must obtain permission, “the government intends to create a 
limited,101 rather than designated public forum.”102 In the event that the government has adopted 
a policy governing access, courts will “examine how that policy has been implemented in 
practice.”103 If a policy requires a speaker to obtain permission before accessing the forum, and 
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that policy is routinely ignored, “such that in practice permission is granted as a matter of course 
to all who seek it, the government may have created a designated public forum.”104 Likewise, the 
courts look to the nature of the property at issue. When a piece of property is “designed for and 
dedicated to expressive activities,” the courts will “more readily infer the intent to create a 
designated public forum.”105 In contrast, if the government uses a particular piece of its property 
as “part of a government-run commercial enterprise, and the expressive activities . . . [permitted] 
are only incidental to that use, that fact tends to support a limited public forum.”106 
The Ninth Circuit applied the above analysis in Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King 
Cnty.107 In that case, the Ninth Circuit determined that advertising space on the side of King 
County Metro buses constituted a limited public forum, and the government’s content based 
restrictions were subject only to rational basis review.108 In order to access Metro’s bus 
advertising program, everyone was required “to obtain permission through a pre-screening 
process.”109 Likewise, the policy had “imposed categorical subject-matter limitations,” including 
the exclusion of ads for alcohol and tobacco products.110 Therefore, the policy intended to grant 
only selective access to the advertising program.  
When reviewing the implementation of the policy, the court noted that the county had “pre-
screened all proposed ads and consistently rejected ads that were non-compliant.”111 The Ninth 
Circuit noted that, when reviewing the implementation of a government policy, the focus is on 
the “enforcement of the policy as a whole, not just the specific provisions invoked to exclude the 
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ads at issue.”112 The court found no evidence that “the County . . . routinely [accepted] . . . non-
compliant ads.”113 
The Ninth Circuit found that the nature of the property—the advertisement space on county 
buses—indicated the creation of a limited public forum. The Court reasoned that the purpose of 
the advertising program was to “generate revenue for the bus system.”114 The property’s use as a 
commercial enterprise was found to be “incompatible with granting the public unfettered access 
for expressive activities” because “allowing certain expressive activity might harm advertising 
sales or tarnish business reputation.”115 On balance, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the factors 
indicated that a limited public forum was created.  
It should be noted that, if a particular piece of property were found to constitute a nonpublic 
forum—or a limited public forum if you are in the Ninth Circuit—in one circuit, it does not 
necessarily mean that it will be the same in another. For instance, the Second Circuit considered 
a similar transit advertising program in New York Magazine v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth.,116 but 
found it to be a designated public forum as opposed to a limited one, and the government’s 
content based restrictions were subjected to strict scrutiny—not rational basis review.  
In that case, the crucial factor for the Second Circuit was the nature of the exclusions. Like 
the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit stated that, if the government were acting in its “proprietary 
capacity for the purpose of raising revenue or facilitating the conduct of its own internal 
business” then the Court would consider the forum to be nonpublic.117 With this in mind, the 
Second Circuit rejected the argument that any restriction on access to the forum evidences an 
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intent not to create a public forum.118 The Court reasoned that exclusions of categories of speech 
through a rule does not “ipso facto [create] a nonpublic forum” because then “every designated 
public forum [would] be converted into a nonpublic forum the moment the government did what 
is supposed to be impermissible in a designated public forum, which is to exclude speech based 
on content.”119 Therefore, the Second Circuit looked to the nature of the excluded categories to 
determine whether the government was really acting in a proprietary interest. When the 
government disallows political speech, and only allows commercial speech, the main goal is to 
make money. Conversely, if political speech were allowed, then it “evidences a general intent to 
open a space for discourse” because “the possibility of clashes of opinion and controversy . . . 
[are] inconsistent with sound commercial practice.”120 Since the MTA allowed both commercial 
and political speech in its advertising space, the Court concluded that the advertising space 
constituted a designated public forum and subjected the government’s content based restrictions 
to strict scrutiny.121  
The Third Circuit was confronted with determining the forum status of a high school 
auditorium in Gregoire v. Centennial School Dist.122 Looking to the district’s policy for renting 
school facilities, the court noted that the district’s revised policy regarding use of its facilities 
provided for religious discussion in some contexts, but also contained provisions “purporting to 
exclude certain categories of religious speech.”123 By virtue of its policy, the district excluded 
“auditorium rental to non-profit and charitable organizations.”124 The district argued that the 
policy evidenced its intent not to create an open forum but to create a closed forum “with access 
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properly restricted to those groups whose purpose is consistent with the educational function and 
mission of the school.”125 The Third Circuit rejected that argument because the district routinely 
allowed politically active groups and commercial profit-making ventures to access the forum, 
none of which related to the school or other civic purposes.126 The “educational mission of the 
school” was so vague that the school had “virtually unlimited discretion in deciding which 
groups qualify and which groups do not.”127 Likewise, the Court noted that “the definition of the 
standards for inclusion and exclusion must be unambiguous and definite.”128 Finally, the Third 
Circuit explained that “school facilities, after hours, are compatible with expressive activity” and 
that “a vast amount of expressive activity takes place now and has taken place in those 
facilities.”129 On balance, the court found that a designated public forum was created and that 
strict scrutiny applied to the school district’s restrictions.130 
While the Third Circuit found that the school facilities in Gregoire constituted a designated 
public forum, the Court reached the opposite conclusion when considering the forum status of 
Arnold Field, an athletic field owned by the school in Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Directors.131 The school board in that case maintained a policy in 
which non-school sponsored organizations had to obtain permission to use Arnold Field.132 The 
Third Circuit found that neither the policy as written, nor “the actual practice” of the school 
board, “manifests an intent to designate Arnold Field as a public forum” because permission was 
never “granted as a matter of course.”133 Likewise, the Court found that the special nature of the 
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property bolstered its conclusion that the school did not intend to create a designated public 
forum. Students, teachers and others do not have “an absolute constitutional right to use all parts 
of a school building or its immediate environs for . . . unlimited express activity.”134 An athletic 
field does not “exist primarily for expressive activity, especially where large numbers of 
nonstudents are involved.”135 
V. A New Hope: A Proposed Public Forum Application To Government Social 
Media Accounts 
While the public forum analysis lends itself to social media pages, not every government 
account should be treated the same. When the courts undertake a forum analysis, they must pay 
particular attention to the nature of the account, specifically, whether that account is used by a 
particular government official or a government agency. The presence of any policy, combined 
with the actual practice of the government, will often determine which forum is present because 
the nature and compatibility of social media with expressive activity will be the same for each 
account. Yet, there are also important policy reasons why accounts should be treated differently. 
Not only will social media accounts of government agencies often constitute a different type of 
forum than the social media account of specific government officials like the President, Senators 
and Governors, but also the social media account of a U.S. Senator should not be treated the 
same for public forum purposes as the social media account of a local city councilman.  
A. Policy and Actual Practice of the Government: Why It Makes A 
Difference 
When Courts begin a forum analysis, the first place to start should always be to look for 
any particular social media policies maintained by the government and the actual practice of the 
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government with respect to that policy. For the most part, individual departments of the federal 
government maintain their own social media policies.136 These policies will usually indicate the 
purpose of the social media account. For instance, the Department of the Interior’s social media 
policy states that its purpose is to “serve as an official means of communication or public 
engagement.”137 Likewise, the Department of Energy uses its social media accounts to “expand 
the conversation on energy issues” and to “engage the public in discussion and include the public 
in the governing process.”138  
Policies like that of the Department of Energy tend to indicate that the government is 
intending to designate their social media account as a designated public forum.139 The policies 
explain why the government is using a social media account; it shows the government is 
intending to open property and do something with it, and if that ‘doing something with it’ turns 
out to be for public discourse, then it is likely a designated public form.140 Even if there is a clear 
policy, courts must still look to the actual practice of the government with respect to that policy. 
If the government consistently enforces its restrictions, then it is more likely that a nonpublic 
forum was created.141 
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Without a policy though, determining the intended use of the forum is more difficult. The 
government could acquire and open property for any number of reasons, not just for expressive 
activities—that’s why intent is the “touchstone of the forum analysis.”142 Rather than 
affirmatively opening an account for public discourse, the government may merely be permitting 
expressive activity to occur, which tends to indicate a nonpublic forum.143 Government accounts 
of specific officials, like President Trump, are less likely to be subjected to a specific social 
media policy.144 While an absence of policy could indicate a nonpublic forum, it may cause these 
types of government officials’ accounts to be considered designated public forums for two 
reasons.145  
First, without a clear standard for exclusion and inclusion, government content based 
restrictions look more like viewpoint suppression. Restrictions can come in the forum of express 
policy statements, or even by the government turning its account to private, which forces users to 
require permission to view and interact with the government account. The restrictions must bear 
some relation to the purpose of the forum, otherwise, when the government “reserves the right to 
exclude a speaker for any reason at all, or without reference to the purpose of the forum, the 
potential for government censorship is at its greatest.”146 If the designated public forum category 
is to “retain any vitality . . . the definition of the standard for inclusion and exclusion must be 
unambiguous and definite.147 For example, the school district in Greoire v. Centennial School 
Dist. argued that it had created a nonpublic forum, limited to activities compatible with the 
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intended purpose of the property and its policy, which stated that performances in a school 
auditorium had to have a school or civic purpose.148 Although the Court agreed that the school 
could place restrictions in order to create a nonpublic forum, the “breadth of access” granted by 
Centennial under its policy undercut its contention that it had created a nonpublic forum.149 Clear 
standards for inclusion and exclusion, required in a nonpublic forum, were absent.150 Effectively, 
the school district claimed it had created a closed forum but routinely granted access to 
“performances . . . not required to relate to school or civic purposes.”151 Clear policy and 
consistent enforcement is key to creating a nonpublic forum. Without it, the accounts of 
government officials, like Senators and Governors, run the risk of being labeled a designated 
public forum because the breadth of access would actually be quite wide—the only people who 
would be “restricted” from the forum are those who express views the government disagrees 
with. In other words, the forum would truly be available to the public at large, which tends to 
indicate a designated public forum. For those courts that assert that a designated public forum 
could be reserved for a limited class of speakers or for limited subjects, and subject content 
based restrictions to strict scrutiny, restrictions could be helpful in distinguishing those that are 
meant to create a designated public forum for a limited purpose from those that are put in place 
in order to preserve the property as a nonpublic forum.152 The distinctions between categories 
matters, because it determines the level of scrutiny that applies, no matter what court one is in.  
Second, without clear policy, courts may give more weight to the nature and 
compatibility of the property with expressive activities when trying to discern the government’s 
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intent.153 This factor will not vary by the type of government account because the nature and 
compatibility of social media is the same for each.  
B. Nature of the Property and Its Compatibility with Expressive Activity 
The nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activities is pretty 
straightforward. The court essentially looks at the general purpose of the property and determines 
if allowing expressive activity would be disruptive to that purpose. For example, the primary 
purpose of a military base is to train soldiers to fight wars—not provide forums for speech.154 
Allowing expressive activity on a military base is disruptive to its purpose and, therefore, the 
property is incompatible with expressive activity. When property is incompatible with expressive 
activity, it tends to support a finding of a nonpublic forum.155 
Justice Kennedy’s description of social media as “the modern public square” is not too 
far off. Twitter is an online social networking service that allows users to interact with one 
another across the country. It allows users to broadcast information within seconds to a wide 
audience, which can include national or local news and the individual user’s thoughts or 
feelings.156 That audience can then engage the original poster in the comment thread, which is 
public to the world.157 A Twitter account can be public, meaning anyone can follow and interact 
with a particular account without permission, or private, in which case permission will be 
required in order to access an account’s page.  
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Facebook is another social networking service and is used by 145.9 million Americans.158 
In 2010, Time Magazine noted Facebook’s ability to connect more than half a billion people 
around the world, redefine relationships, and expand the ability for people to express themselves 
and share information.159 Facebook’s timeline works similarly to Twitter: individual users can 
post what they are doing, thinking, or even publish links to other webpages or news sources. Via 
the comment section, other Facebook users may provide their own thoughts and insights to the 
original poster’s comments, which can often ignite a discussion. Facebook profiles or pages, like 
Twitter, can be public or private, the latter of which requires permission to access. One of the 
defining features of social media platforms in general is their ability to allow users to engage and 
interact from the comforts of their own home.  
Social media’s compatibility with expressive activities is beyond dispute: social media 
was created with the explicit intention to facilitate expressive activity. For instance, Twitter’s 
stated mission is to “give everyone the power to create and share ideas and information instantly, 
without barriers.”160 Likewise, Twitter states that it enables users to “see what people are talking 
about” and to “spark a global conversation.”161 More importantly though, social media spaces 
have special attributes that insulate them, to some degree, from the problems that plague forums 
on real property. 
The most frequent basis for an exclusion, and the finding of a nonpublic forum, is that the 
expression or speaker is distracting or disruptive to such a degree that they interfere with the 
forum’s purpose.162 For instance, the purpose of airport terminals  is to allow passengers to move 
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“as efficiently as possible.”163 If the solicitation of money were allowed in those terminals, it 
arguably would detract from the terminals purpose because “the individual solicited must decide 
whether or not to contribute (which itself might involve reading the solicitors literature or 
hearing his pitch), and then, having decided to do so, reach for a wallet, search it for money, 
write a check or produce a credit card.”164 This would effectively defeat the forums purpose—to 
facilitate movement of passengers as efficiently as possible. As an online forum, social media 
spaces do not lend themselves as readily those types of disruptions. 
The comments thread on social media makes it more difficult for would-be protestors to 
disrupt the forum—but not impossible.165 If a public forum is opened at a municipal auditorium 
for public dialogue about local issues, protestors could disrupt the forum in any number of ways. 
They could physically invade the forum and take control of it, or they could chant and protest so 
loudly that the speaker literally cannot be heard.166 But the comments section of an online forum 
lacks those problems. All comments and responses from the government and the public are in 
text format and are readily available to read without disruption. Even if the government were to 
hold a live Q&A via live video stream, like Facebook Live, those viewing the stream can only 
respond in text.167 Other users could not shout or disrupt the stream in a way that the speaker 
cannot be heard. But that does not necessarily mean that a social media user could never detract 
from the conversation and be disruptive to an intolerable degree.  
                                                 
163 Make the Rd. by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 148 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting International Soc’y For 
Krishna Conciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 , 683 (1992)) 
164 Id.  
165 see Compl. ¶ 29, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3892179/2017-07-11-Knight-Institute-Trump-
Twitter.pdf 
166 See Will DiGravio, Students Protest Lecture by Dr. Charles Murphy at Middlebury College, YOUTUBE  (Mar. 2, 
2017),  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a6EASuhefeI  
167 For live video streams over social media, viewers are permitted to comment in the comments thread of the 
broadcast.  
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The internet is home to an entire online social community known as “Internet trolls.” 
Internet trolls are those who “deliberately tr[y] to disrupt, attack, offend or generally cause 
trouble within [an Internet] community by posting certain comments, photos, videos, GIFs or 
some other form of online content.”168 As masters of sabotage, Internet trolls, working alone or 
with other trolls, could make a series of inflammatory posts to agitate other users and derail the 
purpose of the forum.  
Take the Department of Energy for example. Let’s say that the Department of Energy 
operates a twitter account solely for the purpose of engaging citizens and sparking a conversation 
about energy issues facing the country. If an Internet troll comes along and begins to make a 
series of inflammatory posts about abortion or gun laws, or about something so outrageous like 
the existence of flat earth, and other users begin to discuss those issues over the Department of 
Energy’s twitter account. In that case, the forum has been compromised—it is no longer being 
used for its intended purpose of discussing energy issues.  But the work of internet trolls are not 
nearly disruptive enough to defeat social media’s compatibility with expressive activity, and in 
many ways, social media sites are the quintessential public forum. Social media sites are able to 
instantly connect millions of people, culminating in the ultimate marketplace of ideas.169  
VI. Why Scrutiny Matters: A Variation of Packingham  
On balance, consideration of the policy and practice, government intent, and the nature of 
the property and its compatibility with expressive activities will determine what the forum status 
of government social media accounts are. Once you know which category of public forum the 
property is, you will also know what level of scrutiny to apply. But, as discussed in part V 
                                                 
168 Elise Moreau, 10 Types of Internet Trolls You’ll Meet Online, LIFEWIRE (Jan. 27, 2018) 
https://www.lifewire.com/types-of-internet-trolls-3485894  
169 See generally,  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1919) (Holmes, J., Dissenting). 
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section B, online public forums do not lend themselves as readily to the types of disruptions that 
plague public forums on real property. Any sort of disruption that does occur is likely to be 
addressed by the underlying social media company. So in what circumstances would the level of 
scrutiny matter? The answer is when the government adopts policies that affirmatively exclude 
certain speakers. 
A variation of the Packingham case provides a good example of a restriction whose 
validity could be dependent on the level of scrutiny applied. The statute at issue in Packingham 
v. North Carolina170 made it a “felony for a registered sex offender to access a commercial social 
networking web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to 
become members or to create and maintain personal web pages.”171 The statute was struck down 
not only because the Court recognized social media as an important place for expressive 
activities, but because the statute was overly broad.172 Traditional social media sites, like Twitter 
and Facebook, were arguably not the only ones subject to restriction: sites like “amazon.com, 
thewashingtonpost.com, and webmd.com” would likely qualify.173 However, the Court stated 
that states “could [enact] more specific laws.”174 Unlike the statute at issue in Packingham, the 
government could enact a social media policy that allows individual government social media 
accounts to block registered sex offenders from accessing their specific page. Such a restriction 
would not bar a registered sex offender from creating a social media account altogether, but 
would only prevent them from accessing and engaging a specific government account.  
                                                 
170 137 S.Ct. 1730 (2017). 
171 Id. at 1733.  
172 Id. at 1736. 
173 Id.  
174 Id. at 1737. 
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In resolving whether such policies are valid restrictions, what court the case is in will, in 
many cases, be outcome determinative because of the different approaches the circuit courts take 
to the categories of public forum. The categories themselves matter because they dictate what 
level of scrutiny the government is held to, and a restriction may survive under one test but not 
the other.  
First, we can examine the restriction under strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, content 
based exclusions are valid “when the exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest 
and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.”175 In the case of the sex offender 
restriction, the state could argue that the compelling interest it serves is the protection of 
children, which has been found to be a compelling state interest.176 The ultimately validity of the 
statute, as was the case in Packingham, will rest on whether that restriction is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that interest.  
In one sense, the restriction is about as narrow you can get. There isn’t much the state can 
do by way of restricting other social media user’s ability to access the government account aside 
from deleting their comments or blocking them outright. Preventing sex offenders from 
accessing a government account arguably provides minors a safe place to engage other users and 
get information. According to the Justice Department, in 76% of sex crimes against minors, the 
first encounter with a predator occurred in an online chatroom.177 The restriction could be seen as 
a way to limit the possibility of an encounter between the sex offender and minor. It does not 
take any stretch of the imagination to know that a sexual predator and young minor could 
exchange views over a government social media account’s post, continue to converse privately 
                                                 
175 Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001).  
176 Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 88 (1st Cir. 2004).  
177 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raising Awareness About Sexual Abuse: Facts and Statistics, 
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with direct messaging, which could lead to a meet up. Through the course of public debate, and 
especially online, users often reveal personal experiences or information in support of their 
viewpoint about issues like abortion. The revelation of personal information or past experiences 
could be used by a predator to lull an unsuspecting minor into a feeling of comfort with the 
predator, who may then convince the minor to meet up in person and engage in sexual activity.  
 On the other hand, the restriction may not be so narrowly tailored. In essence, the 
government restriction may have such a minimal impact on preventing an encounter that it casts 
doubt on the necessity of imposing the restriction.178 In that case, the restriction could be seen as 
“burdening substantially more speech than is necessary to further its interests” because the sex 
offenders could not lend their viewpoint on matters of public concern.179 While the validity of a 
restriction on sex offenders could survive strict scrutiny, it may have a better chance under 
rational basis review. 
The lowest level of scrutiny, rational basis review, requires that restrictions are 
“reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum and reflect a legitimate government concern.”180 
These restrictions need not be the “most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.”181 
Likewise, the government does not need to ensure “the presence of adequate alternative 
outlets.”182 Even if the restriction is reasonable, “it will be struck down if it is in reality a façade 
for viewpoint-based discrimination.” 183 Since the protection of minors against abuse has been 
found to be a compelling interest, there is little doubt that it would qualify as a legitimate 
government concern. If the purpose of the forum is to facilitate public discourse, or even just to 
                                                 
178 See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, 127 S. Ct 2738, 2760 (2007) (finding that 
the minimal impact on discrimination indicated that other methods could have been employed).  
179 Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186, 198 (4th Cir. 1999).  
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get the government’s message out, the State could argue that, by preventing registered sex 
offenders from entering the forum, the forum itself does not become an enclave for the sexual 
predation of minors. Likewise, such a restriction is unlikely to be found as a pretext for 
viewpoint discrimination, because the restriction applies to all registered sex offenders, 
regardless of their particular views.  
VII. Heads Will Roll: Can Donald Trump Block Me On Twitter? 
With the contours of the public forum doctrine sufficiently defined, applying it to 
government social media accounts is quite routine. Donald Trump’s account will be used as an 
example for analysis because accounts like his will be the hardest to categorize. Social media 
accounts of agencies like the Department of Energy are easier to categorize because those 
accounts are more likely to be subjected to clear policy, which often evidences government 
intent and the standards for inclusion and exclusion. Categorizing accounts like Donald Trump 
are much harder, because these accounts are often not subject to policy, which makes discerning 
intent more difficult. It should be noted that the relevant forum is Donald Trump’s twitter 
account as a whole, not his individual posts. For the purposes of this discussion, it will be 
assumed that Trump is engaged in state action, making his use of twitter equivalent to the 
government using twitter.184 
At a bare minimum, Donald Trump’s twitter account is a nonpublic forum.185 Government 
owned property, or private property burdened by the government, will fall into one of three 
                                                 
184 
https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/12_21_letter%20re%20government%20concession%20in%20tr
avel%20ban%20case.pdf 
185 Even if government property could not be forum at all, Arkansas Educ. Television Com’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 
666, 677 (1998), social media accounts could not fall into that category. Social media is so compatible with 
expressive activity that some form of First Amendment protections must apply. If any property were to not 
constitute a type of forum at all, it would most likely be jails and military bases, given the substantial disruption that 
expressive activity can cause on those properties.  
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categories of forum—traditional, designated, or nonpublic.186  Since Twitter does not qualify as a 
traditional public forum, if Trump’s account is not found to be a designated public forum, then 
by default, it is a nonpublic forum.187 There real question then, is whether Donald Trump’s 
account qualifies as a designated public forum. 
As discussed in Part V section B, social media accounts are highly compatible with 
expressive activity. As an online forum, they do not lend themselves as readily to the types of 
disruptions that forums on real property do. Comments that would otherwise be disruptive in a 
forum on real property could have less of an impact on an online forum because the disruptive 
comment could easily be ignored by others in the forum—users have the choice to only respond 
to comments conveying legitimate arguments and ideas. Moreover, online forums eliminate 
spatial issues and can accommodate thousands of users and comments.188 Likewise, online 
forums also eliminate timing issues. When the government creates a forum on real property, that 
forum often has a limited life span. For instance, if the government were to designate an 
auditorium as a public forum, it’s likely that the event will run for a specific period of time. Once 
the event is over, the public may not have the same right of access to that property or those 
speakers, because the forum will cease to exist. But this is not so on an online forum. 
Conversations occurring over specific government posts in an online forum can last for hours if 
not days later. Therefore, online forums maximize the “marketplace of ideas” because all voices 
                                                 
186 For the purposes of the following discussion, designated public forum is used to described a place that the 
government has opened to the public generally for expressive activities. Content based restrictions in this forum are 
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have an opportunity to be heard at one point or another.189 With these considerations in mind, 
this factor, the nature and compatibility of social media with expressive activities, would tend to 
support finding his twitter account is a designated public forum.  
Turning next to policy and the actual practice of Donald Trump with respect to his use of 
twitter, it appears as though no clear policy controls his use of twitter. For starters, Trump’s 
account is set to public, meaning that anyone can follow his account without first having to 
request permissions. If speakers do not have to obtain permission before accessing the forum, 
courts have concluded that the policy factor favors a designated public forum.190 However, even 
if permission were required, an absence of clear policy could be fatal to any argument that only a 
nonpublic forum exists. Since the definitions for exclusion and inclusion are not clearly defined, 
the risk for government censorship is at its greatest. For example, the First Knight Institute 
alleges that Rebecca Buckwalter, a writer and legal analyst,  was blocked by Trump because she 
asserted the Russia won the White House for Trump in the comment section of one of his 
tweets.191In the absence of policy, it’s more likely that such an action would be considered 
viewpoint discrimination because Ms. Buckwalter was blocked shortly after expressing her 
viewpoint, one that Trump presumably does not agree with nor wants circulating around social 
media. In fact, in the First Knight Institute case, the government conceded that the plaintiffs were 
blocked because their tweets criticized the President and his policies—which is impermissible in 
                                                 
189 See generally Joseph Blocher, Institutions in The Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L. J. 821 (2008) 
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all types of forums.192 Moreover, Trump has repeatedly stated that his social media account is the 
only way to combat the “Fake News Media.”193 A court could readily conclude, then, that Trump 
intended to use his social media account as a legitimate source for reliable information gathering 
by the public, and to allow citizens to engage in debate in the comments section. This factor then, 
would tend to indicate that a designated public forum exists.  
Finally, considering Trump occupies one of the most powerful offices in the world, a thumb 
should be placed on the scale for finding a designated public forum. Even though Trump is use to 
the spotlight, he must have had some expectation that, once elected President, his use of twitter 
would be scrutinized even further and that those tweets would carry the weight and power of the 
United States. In other words, Trump must have had some expectation that everything he says 
and does on twitter could be equated to government action because of the difficultly in 
separating Donald Trump the man from Donald Trump the President. This is drastically different 
from a run of the mill local official who uses twitter to reach local voters and discuss local 
issues. Holding a local official to a higher standard of review, strict scrutiny, for content based 
restrictions may result in less government participation at the local level, especially considering 
how embedded social media is in our daily lives.  
On balance, all of these factors would tend to support a finding that Donald Trump’s twitter 
account, so long as he is President, constitutes a designated public forum. Although no one factor 
is dispositive in this analysis, the lack of clear policy could be fatal to the government’s assertion 
that only a nonpublic forum exists, because the nature and compatibility of social media sites 
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with expressive activity is so strong and the likelihood of problematic disruptions is low.194 And 
just from a policy perspective, courts may want to lean toward finding high government 
official’s accounts as designated public forum given the national interest in what they do and 
what they have to say. But in the actual case against Trump, the type of forum his account 
constitutes will probably not matter in the end because Trump has engaged in viewpoint 
discrimination, which is impermissible in all forums.195 
VIII. Conclusion  
Although the rise of the Digital Age will inevitably pose novel issues, our legal system is 
equipped to handle them. The question over the forum status of social media accounts is no 
different. Social media accounts constitute a significant enough property interest, by way of the 
domain name, that the public forum doctrine can be applied where the government creates an 
account to engage the public. Which category of public forum a particular account will fall into 
will be dependent not only on the type of account, but on which Circuit Court the case is filed in. 
Supreme Court precedent has created different approaches by different circuit courts, which use  
different names, and more importantly, differing levels of scrutiny for each category of  public 
forum. Finally, the fact that social media websites are privately owned should have no bearing on 
whether a particular account can be considered a public forum. When the government uses 
private property for the benefit of the public, the property should effectively be seen as 
governmental in nature. If the property is seen as governmental in nature, then those accounts 
must comport with the requirements of the Constitution. 
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